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A PRECEDENT BUILT ON SAND: NORCON
V NIAGARA MOHAWKt
Victor P. Goldberg*
Under the common law, a contracting party could only
demand assurance of performance if the other party was
insolvent. If a party had reasonable grounds for insecurity,
the UCC Section 2-609 allowed it to demand adequate
assurance even if the counterparty were solvent.
The
Restatement (Second) adopted the same rule for non-goods.
In NorCon v. Niagara Mohawk the New York court extended
the adequate assurance doctrine for some non-goods
contracts. Although the decision seems to imply that there is
some relation between the NorCon facts and its conclusion as
to the law, there is none. Relying primarily on material
available to the court, this paper examines the contract, the
context in which it was written, and the events precipitating
Niagara Mohawk's insecurity. While Niagara Mohawk's
insecurity was no doubt justified-NorCon would almost
certainly have walked away from its obligation for the last
ten years of the contract-the assurance question had been a
major issue in negotiating this contract, and in similar
contracts involving Niagara Mohawk and other public
utilities.

t Conflict of interest statement: The expert witness for Niagara
Mohawk in this case was Eugene Meehan of National Economic Research
Associates ("NERA"). I am an outside consultant to NERA. I was not
associated with NERA when the initial report was made, but I was
associated with the firm when the case was tried in 1999. I had no
knowledge of NERA's involvement until after I had completed a first draft.
After reading an early draft of this paper, Mr. Meehan provided me with
some information from his files and with some insights regarding the
contract and the regulatory context.
* Jerome L. Greene Professor of Transactional Law, Columbia Law
School. I would like to thank Bob Scott and Steve Burton for comments on
an earlier draft. I also want to acknowledge the valuable research
assistance of Zach Moore and Ni Qian.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Suppose that A has entered into a contract with B, but B
comes to believe that A will not perform. What can B do? It
could perform its obligation and, if A did indeed fail to
perform, it could pursue its legal remedies. This might not
be a very attractive option if the costs of going to court were
high and there was a reasonable likelihood that B would not
be able to collect part, or all, of the judgment. It could treat
A as a breacher and withhold its performance; it would,
however, run the risk that a court might find that B, not A,
had breached. Or it could demand assurance from A that it
would perform. The common law did not give B that right,
with one exception. If A were insolvent, B could suspend
performance or insist upon a cash payment. Otherwise,
absent language in the contract or A acknowledging its
unwillingness to perform (an anticipatory repudiation), B
was faced with this awkward choice.
The UCC Section 2-609 expanded the insecure B's options
by allowing it to demand "adequate assurance" if it had
reasonable grounds for believing that A would not perform.
But what if the contract were not governed by the UCC? The
Restatement (Second) extrapolated from the UCC and
recognized a right to demand adequate assurance in contract
disputes not involving goods (it was really sort of a
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(P)restatement since the drafters had no precedent outside
the UCC):
1) Where reasonable grounds arise to believe that
the obligor will commit a breach by nonperformance that would of itself give the obligee a
claim for damages for total breach ... the obligee
may demand adequate assurance of due
performance and may, if reasonable, suspend any
performance for which he has not already received
the agreed exchange until he receives such
assurance.
2) The obligee may treat as a repudiation the
obligor's failure to provide within a reasonable
time such assurance of due performance as is
adequate in the circumstances of the particular
case.1
The issue arose in a federal case applying New York

law-NorCon Power Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk
Power Corp.2 The Second Circuit sent the following certified
question to the New York Court of Appeals:
Does a party have the right to demand adequate
assurance of future performance when reasonable
grounds arise to believe that the other party will
commit a breach by non-performance of a contract
governed by New York law, where the other party is
solvent and the contract is not governed by the
U.C.C.? 3
The Court of Appeals could simply have said that we
adopt the enlightened reasoning of the Restatement. That
might not have been the wisest policy, but the decision would
have been unassailable. However, after a lengthy exegesis
on the merits of that position, the court chose a more
nuanced position. It narrowed the question, making much of

§ 251 (2010).
NorCon Power Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 110
F.3d 6, 7 (2d Cir. 1997).
3 Id. at 9.
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
2
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of common

law

We conclude, therefore, that it is unnecessary, while
fulfilling the important and useful certification role,
to promulgate so sweeping a change and proposition
in contract law, as has been sought, in one dramatic
promulgation. That approach might clash with our
customary incremental common-law developmental
process, rooted in particular fact patterns and keener
wisdom acquired through observations of empirical
application of a proportioned, less than absolute, rule
in future cases.

..

. Experience and patience thus

offer a more secure and realistic path to a better and
fairer rule, in theory and in practical application.
Therefore, this Court chooses to take the
traditionally subtler approach, consistent with the
proven benefits of the maturation process of the
common law, including in the very area of
anticipatory repudiation which spawns this relatively
newer demand for assurance corollary.4
The nuanced approach would be guided by the facts of the
specific case, with future cases fleshing out the contours of
the right. That sounds great. We do not have to rely on the
example of the UCC or the authority of the Restatement and
its distinguished chief reporter, Allan Farnsworth.
Following this strategy (or, more precisely, claiming to follow
this strategy) the court extended the right to demand
assurance, but only for a subset of disputes. It was "now
persuaded that the policies underlying the UCC Section 2609 counterpart should apply with similar cogency for the
resolution of this kind of controversy."'
The type of
controversy is spelled out later in the opinion: "It should
apply to the type of long-term commercial contract between
corporate entities .. . which is complex and not reasonably

4 NorCon Power Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 705
N.E.2d 656, 661-62 (N.Y. 1998) (citation omitted).
5 Id. at 662 (emphasis added).
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susceptible of all security features being anticipated,
bargained for and incorporated in the original contract."'
There is one big problem with this conclusion. There is
nothing in the opinion that would suggest why this kind of
controversy should be singled out. What, in particular, does
the court mean when it says that security features could not
be anticipated in the original contract? Perhaps, I thought,
the district court's opinion might shed some light on the
question. It did, but not in the way I had anticipated. Judge
Sprizzo noted that the contract did deal with the security
issue. If NorCon failed to perform, Niagara Mohawk would
have a lien on its plant.7 Perhaps Sprizzo mischaracterized
the assurance embodied in the contract. Wrong. Indeed, if
anything, he understated the contractual assurance afforded
Niagara Mohawk.
This struck me as odd. Why would a court go out of its
way to find a right to demand assurance when the
contracting parties appear to have negotiated a term to deal
with this problem? The disconnect, I surmised, must have
arisen from the certification process-the question was
acontextual and, I thought, perhaps the court had no
knowledge of the context. Wrong again. In fact, the briefs
included detailed specifics about the contract and its context,
including some of the negotiating history regarding the
assurance. 8
NorCon, 705 N.E.2d at 662.
Encogen Four Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 914
F. Supp. 57, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("To secure this risk, the parties
negotiated and agreed to a provision in the Encogen Agreement granting
Niagara Mohawk a security interest in the Encogen Facility to secure
Encogen's performance and any balance in the adjustment account
remaining at the end of the third period."), vacated sub nom. NorCon
Power Partners v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 163 F.3d 153 (2d Cir.
1998). Encogen and NorCon were similarly situated non-utility generators
("NUGs"). The initial suit was in Encogen's name. The appeal and
subsequent litigation concerned NorCon.
8 The NorCon court issued the following order:
6
7

On consideration of the briefs, appendix, record, and the
oral argument in this appeal, it is hereby ORDERED that
the Clerk of this court transmit to the Clerk of the New
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There is no way to get from the particular facts of this
case to the broad question certified to the New York court or
to the narrower question the court answered. The court
could, as I noted, have answered the certified question
without regard to the NorCon-Niagara Mohawk dispute; the
judges were only being asked for a statement of the law. But
it did not. It presented some of the facts and then leapt to a
conclusion implying that the conclusion bore some
relationship to the stated facts ("this kind of controversy"). If
the NorCon facts are irrelevant, then the court provides no
basis for its conclusion. And if they are relevant, the court
provides no basis for its characterization of this kind of
controversy.
Well, so what? Why worry that the precedent happens to
be built on sand? There are two responses. First, NorCon is
the leading case in the leading commercial law jurisdiction.
If the decision is fundamentally flawed, can future parties
rely on its continued vitality? Second, and perhaps more
importantly, NorCon provides a good illustration of a
problem Judge Posner raised nearly a quarter century ago:
And especially in cases where there is no published
dissent, judicial opinions exemplify "winners'
history." The appellate court will usually state the
facts as favorably to its conclusions as the record
allows, and often more favorably.... The tendency I
have described is abetted by the reluctance of
academic commentators to expand their study of
cases beyond judicial opinions. Rarely will the
commentator get hold of the briefs and record to

York Court of Appeals a certificate in the form attached,
together with a complete copy of the briefs, appendix and
record filed by the parties with this court.
NorCon Power Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 110 F.3d 6,
7 (2d Cir. 1997). Compare id., certifying question, with NorCon Power
Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 705 N.E.2d 656 (N.Y.
1998), certified question answered.
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check the accuracy of the factual recitals in the
opinion.9
In this instance the problem with the facts is more one of
omission, rather than misstatement. The result is the
same-an inaccurate picture and an unsupportable
conclusion.
What does one do with such an unfounded precedent? In
this instance, a rethinking of the doctrine is in order. If
anything, the court got it backwards. The camel's nose is
coming under the wrong end of the tent. If the adequate
assurance doctrine is to develop incrementally, the
appropriate end of the contract spectrum is not complex,
heavily negotiated contracts in which the issue of adequate
assurance can be (and, arguably, has been) bargained over ex
ante. Rather, if the doctrine is to be extended beyond the
sale of goods, it should be for contracts in which the parties
are not likely to have put much thought into the matter: a
"they-would-have-included-it-had-they-bothered-to-thinkabout-it" type of case. I am not arguing that the doctrine
should be extended, only that this would have been a more
appropriate incremental extension.
Now, the court only said that New York would recognize
the adequate assurance doctrine in this type of transaction.
It does not follow that a court, upon rehearing, would have
required that NorCon provide such assurance. That would
depend upon the facts. The case did eventually go to trial,
but the parties settled before a decision was rendered. As we
shall see in Part VII, NorCon did well in the settlement, but
the uncertainty of the application of the law impacted the
settlement negotiations. If the decision remains good law,
the right to demand assurance, even if the demand were
likely to fail, could be a valuable asset in renegotiation of a
contract or bargaining over settlement terms.
The case itself was merely one skirmish in a bigger battle,
the origins of which precede this particular agreement by
over a decade. The story begins with federal legislation that
9 RICHARD
(1990).

A.

POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 210-11

No. 1:38]

NORCON V NIAGARA MOHAWK

45

was supposed to reduce American dependence on foreign oil.
Public utility electric companies, like Niagara Mohawk, were
required to buy power from non-utility generators (or
"NUGs"), like NorCon.10 The utilities entered into contracts
with the NUGs, not because they wanted to, but because
they had to. The shape of these agreements was determined
in part by years of litigation and by proceedings in state
public utility commissions. Niagara Mohawk, like many
other utilities, had long-term agreements with a large
number of NUGs in the early 1990's-its general counsel
claimed that there were more than 150 such contracts in
1996.11 When changed circumstances made these contracts

appear very bad from the utilities' perspective, they
responded by trying to get the contracts revised, terminated,
or bought out. The demand for adequate assurance was only
one of the strategies deployed.
The larger context is crucial to understanding why the
contract took the form that it did. As will be described in
Part II, the NorCon decision was only one of many involving
disputes between public utilities and independent power
producers operating under long-term contracts. The NorCon
contract will be described in Part III. Part IV presents the
problem that triggered Niagara's demand for assurance. The
litigation will be summarized in Part V. The parties'
awareness of the risks associated with contracts of this sort
and the buyer's need for some form of assurance will be
considered in Part VI. Niagara settled most of its disputes
with the NUGs, including the NorCon dispute; the terms of
the settlements will be presented in Part VII. Part VIII
concludes.

10 While the legislation was supposed to encourage the use of nonhydrocarbon sources, some of the NUGs, including NorCon, were powered
by natural gas.
11 Paul
J. Kaleta, Reassessment of PURPA Power Purchase
Agreements, and PURPA Itself, Is Imperative with the Advent of
Competitive Electric Markets, J. STRUCTURED FIN., Spring 1996, at 6, 8.
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II. THE CONTEXT
Congress enacted the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act ("PURPA") in 1978.12 The avowed purpose was to reduce
dependence on foreign oil by encouraging the development of
Regulated electric power
alternative power sources.
companies were required to purchase power in long-term
Power Purchase Agreements ("PPAs") from alternative
power producers, like NorCon. PURPA directed the Federal
Regulatory Energy Commission ("FERC") to issue rules to be
implemented by the states to buy electricity from alternative
qualifying suppliers ("QFs")." To encourage the QFs, much
of the price risk was shifted from the QFs to utilities and
ratepayers. 14 Prices were to be based on long-run avoided
costs ("LRAC"). The LRAC is the cost that the utility would
have to bear, but for the agreement with this supplier.
Significantly, the LRAC could either be reckoned at the time

12 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act ("PURPA"), 16 U.S.C. §§
2601-45 (2011).
13 To complete the alphabet soup, the QFs were also labeled NUG or
independent power producers ("IPPs"). There was not quite a 100%
overlap between the three categories, but it is close enough that I will use
the terms interchangeably.
14 Almost a decade after passage of the Act, the FERC noted:

A major purpose of PURPA is to encourage cogeneration
and small power production. The uncertainty of future
revenues from purchases by utilities can make it difficult
for the QF developer to obtain project financing. The
principal reason for the existence of fixed-price contracts
between utilities and QFs is to reduce this uncertainty by
shifting risks from the QF to the purchasing utility or its
ratepayers. The regulations implementing section 210 of
PURPA recognize this and provide specific authority for
utilities and QFs to enter into long-term, fixed-price
contracts designed to give developers the financial security
they need to make these projects viable.
Administrative Determination of Full Avoided Costs, Sales of Power to
Qualifying Facilities, and Inter-Connection Facilities, FERC Docket No.
32,457 (proposed Mar. 16, 1988) (to be
RM88-6-000, FERC (CCH)
codified at 18 C.F.R. § 292) [hereinafter FERC Admin. Determination].

1:38]
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15
That difference
of contracting or at the time of delivery.
turns out to be crucial to understanding why the NorCon
deal, and others, fell apart so quickly.
In one of the many pieces of litigation generated by this
law, the Second Circuit summarized what happened next in
New York:

In 1980, the New York legislature enacted New York
Public Service Law § 66-c, which provided that the
PSC [Public Service Commission] would require
state-regulated electric utilities to enter into
agreements for the purchase of electricity from QFs.
The PSC was charged with overseeing the
contracting process, including approval of the
contracts and setting power purchase rates. New
York initially did not adopt PURPA's "avoided cost"
ceiling for electricity purchases. In 1981, section 66-c
was amended to require the PSC to establish a
minimum sales price of at least six cents per kilowatt
hour for power purchased from state qualifying QFs.
This amendment is commonly referred to as the "SixCent Law." The New York legislature amended
section 66-c again in 1992, partially repealing the
The 1992 amendment, however,
Six-Cent Law.
preserved the six-cent minimum rate with respect to
certain contracts executed and filed with the PSC on
or before June 26, 1992 ....

15 Section 292.304(d) requires:
Each qualifying facility shall have the option . . . (2) To

provide energy or capacity pursuant to a legally enforceable
obligation for the delivery of energy or capacity over a
specified term, in which case the rates for such purchases
shall, at the option of the qualifying facility exercised prior
to the beginning of the specified term, be based on either:
(i) The avoided costs calculated at the time of delivery; or
(ii) The avoided costs calculated at the time the obligation
is incurred.
18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d) (2013).
16 Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
306 F.3d 1264, 1266-67 (2d Cir. 2002).
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The six-cent rate was above the LRAC when implemented
in the early 1980's. After years of litigation and regulatory
hearings, the FERC ruled that the states could no longer set
a minimum price above the LRAC. However, the ruling was
only prospective, grandfathering in the earlier contracts."
Niagara Mohawk had eighteen long-term contracts with the
six-cent rate.
Seven were settled in the Master
Restructuring Agreement (to be discussed below). The
others it continued to litigate without success in suits
against the PSC and FERC.18 A second set of contracts was
long-term, front-loaded contracts. In some the contract price
was fixed for the life of the agreement (typically fifteen
years) at a discount from the projected LRAC.1'9 In others,
which included the NorCon agreement, it was anticipated
that the utility would overpay in the early years and make
up the difference with a "tracking account" in the later years.
Niagara Mohawk's general counsel noted that most of these
were "held by large gas-fired cogeneration projects and
represent the most onerous IPP [Independent Power
Producer] contracts in Niagara Mohawk's generation mix." 20
The higher the expected prices paid to the QFs, the more
encouragement there would be for alternative power sources.
There is a potential tradeoff between encouraging the
alternative sources and consumer prices, although courts
and regulators initially denied it. The hoped-for results from
PURPA were often cited. For example: "As noted by PSC, if
17 Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc., 43 FERC
61,067, 61,185 (1988);
Conn. Light & Power Co., 70 FERC 61,012 (1995).

18 NiagaraMohawk, 306 F.3d 1264; Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v.

FERC. 162 F. Supp. 2d 107 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp.
v. Saranac Power Partners L.P., 117 F. Supp. 2d 211 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). For
details of the extensive battles in courts and administrative agencies, see
Rohit C. Sharma, Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FERC, 23 ENERGY L.J.
57 (2002).
19 The contracts N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. ("NYSEG") had with
two QFs, Saranac and Lockport, were both for fifteen years. In both
instances, NYSEG had attempted to get a tracking mechanism
incorporated into the contract but had been rebuffed by the PSC. See N. Y
State Elec. & Gas Corp., 117 F. Supp. 2d at 218.
20

Kaleta, supra note 11, at 11.
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this project is successful, ratepayers will benefit in the future
from cheaper electricity that will more than offset the above
avoided-costs rates paid during the first half of the contract,
in addition to having a new and innovative garbage-toenergy domestic power supply technology."2 1 The Supreme
Court held early on that in promulgating its regulations, the
FERC should err on the side of encouraging the nontraditional producers.22 As time passed, the adverse impact
on future electricity consumers became more likely, and the
future benefits from encouraging the non-petroleum sources
became less likely; the PSC (and some regulators from other
states), came to put more weight on the high prices to be
borne by the utility's customers.
The system worked; indeed, it worked too well. Within a
decade, Niagara Mohawk had been required to enter into
contracts for IPP output greater than the power demand in
its service territory. Years later it summarized the situation:
Since PURPA and the Six-Cent Law were passed, the
Company was obligated to purchase electricity
offered from IPPs in quantities in excess of its own
demand and at prices in excess of those available to
the Company by internal generation or for purchase
in the wholesale market. In fact, by 1991, the
Company was facing a potential obligation to
purchase power from IPPs substantially in excess of
its peak demand of 6,093 MW [megawatt]. As a
result, the Company's competitive position and
financial performance deteriorated and the price of
electricity paid per KWh [kilowatt-hour] by its
customers rose significantly above the national
average. Accordingly, in 1991 the Company initiated
a parallel strategy of negotiating individual PPA
buyouts, cancellations and renegotiations, and of
pursuing regulatory and legislative support and
litigation to mitigate the Company's obligation under
the PPAs. By mid-1996, this strategy resulted in
21

Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 530 N.Y.S.2d

626, 629 (App. Div. 1988).
22

(1983).

Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402
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reducing the Company's obligations to purchase
power under its PPA portfolio to approximately 2,700
MW. 23
When the regulated electric utilities' actual avoidable
costs fell below the contract prices (the six-cent rate or the
projected avoidable costs), they scrambled to revise or
terminate their obligations. The NorCon litigation was only
one of many proceedings involving Niagara that ended up in
court or regulatory commission proceedings. 24 But, Niagara
was not the only New York utility enmeshed in such
litigation.2 5 Nor were the battles limited to just New York
utilities. 26 Regulators in some states were sympathetic to
the utilities and their rate-payers, but their efforts to alter
the contracts were opposed by the QFs, which successfully
argued that modification was preempted by PURPA.2 7
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar.
24, 2000) [hereinafter 1999 Annual Report], available at http://www.
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/71932/0001079182-00-000034.txt.
24 The following is a partial listing of Niagara's IPP litigation: Fulton
Cogeneration Assocs. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 84 F.3d 91 (2d Cir.
1996); O'Shanter Res., Inc. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 915 F. Supp.
560 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); Stevens & Thompson Paper Co., Inc. v. Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp., 750 N.Y.S.2d 335 (App. Div. 2002); Sterling Powers
Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 657 N.Y.S.2d 604 (App.
Div. 1997); Sterling Powers Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp., 657 N.Y.S.2d 407 (App. Div. 1997).
25 See, e.g., N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Saranac Power
Partners,
L.P., 267 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2001); N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., Case Nos.
96-E-0131, 95-E-1162, (N.Y. Dep't Pub. Serv. Feb. 5, 2002), 2002 WL
1022642; Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 472 N.E.2d 981 (N.Y.
1984), appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 1831 (1985); Orange & Rockland Utils.,
Inc., 43 FERC T 61,067 (1998), reh'g denied, 43 FERC
61,546 (1988);
Kamine/Besicorp Allegany L.P. v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 908 F.
Supp. 1180 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).
26 See, e.g., Freehold Cogeneration Assocs., L.P. v. Bd. of Regulatory
Comm'rs, 44 F.3d 1178 (3d Cir. 1995); Indep. Energy Producers Ass'n, Inc.
v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n., 36 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 1994); Smith
Cogeneration Mgmt., Inc. v. Corp. Comm'n, 863 P.2d 1227 (Okla. 1993).
27 Freehold, 44 F.3d at 1194. Similarly, in Smith, the court rejected a
provision that would have allowed reconsideration and modification by the
Corporation Commission of avoided costs after the contract had been
agreed upon. Smith, 863 P.2d at 1229.
23
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III. THE CONTRACT
NorCon was a limited partnership with the sole purpose
of building, owning, and operating this QF.2 8 It was a special
purpose entity with no other assets. 29 The lender's sole
source of repayment would be the future stream of revenue.
In April 1989, the NorCon-Niagara PPA was submitted to
the PSC, which had to approve all contracts with QFs. The
PSC rejected the initial agreement in part because the
security was inadequate. An amended agreement dated
After a second
January 3, 1991 was also rejected.
amendment, the agreement was finalized on July 22, 1991.
NorCon would construct a power plant and Niagara would
take all the output for twenty-five years. NorCon was
financed by a fifteen-year, $120 million loan from GE
Capital. Construction was completed in late 1992, and on
December 12, 1992, NorCon began delivering electricity to
Niagara.
The relevant terms of the agreement for our purposes are
the pricing formula and the security arrangements.
According to PURPA, the avoidable cost standard could
either refer to prices when electricity was actually delivered,
or estimated LRAC at the time the contract was entered into.
The NorCon-Niagara PPA combined the two. It incorporated
the 1988 LRAC projections for fifteen years, which had been
determined by the PSC. LRAC projections for both peak and
off-peak sales for the life of the contract were included as an
attachment to the contract. Table 1 gives a weighted
average for the years 1996 - 2007. The pricing rule covered
It is somewhat confusing because the
three periods.
agreement includes two adjustment accounts. The former
divides the first period from the second; the latter

The general partner was Northern Consolidated Power, Inc.
Transcript of Record at 391, NorCon Power Partners, L.P. v.
Niagara Mohawk Corp., No. 94 Civ. 1530 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 1999)
[hereinafter Transcript of Record] (on file with the Columbia Business
Law Review). These special purpose entities were often referred to as
"PURPA machines."
28
29
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accumulates in the second period and is supposed to be
eliminated in the course of the third period.
IAR A MonAwV

1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

80.58
84.13
87.73
91.63
95.63
99.73
104.14
108.73
113.43
118.43
123.63
129.04

T.RAf'Q 1Q

28.70
30.90
32.40
36.70
41.30
46.20
51.00
56.10
61.60
67.30
72.00
79.00

In the first period, the price would be six cents per KWh.
Since the projected LRAC was below six cents in the early
years, the contract deliberately front-loaded the payments.
After a few years the projected LRAC would exceed six cents.
Because there were two LRAC schedules-peak and offpeak-and because the quantity would vary, the date at
which the LRAC would exceed six cents would depend on the
mix and the interest rate. When the LRAC was less than six
cents, the difference would go into a "cumulative avoided cost
account." When the LRAC exceeded six cents, that account
would be reduced accordingly. When the account reached
zero, the first period would be at an end.a' The period was
expected to last about four years.3 2
30 Letter from
Clement E. Nadeau, Vice President, Power
Transactions & Planning, Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., to James R.
Douglass, President, Northern Consolidated Power, Inc. app. at 1-3 (Feb.
4, 1994) [hereinafter Demand Letter] (on file with the Columbia Business
Law Review).
31 Amounts in this account (and the adjustment account) would bear
interest at 1.25 times the one-year Treasury bill rate. Agreement between
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In the second period, the price would be 95% of Niagara's
"tariff-avoided cost," subject to a ceiling and a floor, both
based on the 1988 LRAC. The tariff-avoided cost is the
current avoided cost. So, if the projected LRAC proved to be
accurate, this would be a 5% discount. If, however, the two
diverged, the ceiling and floor might come into play, as in
fact happened. The ceiling and floor were both based on the
LRAC schedule. The ceiling was 110% of the schedule and
the floor 90%. If either were binding, the difference would go
into an "adjustment account." The second period ended
fifteen years after the initial delivery of electricity. For the
remaining ten years, the price would be 90% of the tariffavoided cost, adjusted for any amount remaining in the
adjustment account. 33 If things worked out, the back-end
discounts would more than make up for the front-loaded
This mechanism, adopted in many contracts
payments.
between electric utilities and QFs, is referred to as a
"tracking mechanism," or a "true-up." The details of the
true-up are not important. Suffice it to say that if, as
Niagara projected, NorCon ended up with a considerable
surplus, the price it would be paid in the later years would
Indeed, as we shall see, if
be substantially reduced.

Northern Consol. Power, Inc. and Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. 15 (Apr.
28, 1989) [hereinafter Norcon-Niagara Agreement] (on file with the
Columbia Business Law Review). The PSC required that the rate in the
first period be 11%. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. Energy Purchase
Agreement, Case No. 91-E-0121 (N.Y. Dep't Pub. Serv. Jan 25, 1991)
(request for approval) [hereinafter EPA Approval Request] (on file with
author).
32 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 5, NorCon Power Partners, L.P. v.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 705 N.E. 2d 656 (N.Y. 1998) (No. 10518)
(on file with Columbia Business Law Review).
33 Prior to the amendment required by the PSC, the third period price
was to be 95% of the avoided costs. See EPA Approval Request, supra note
31.
34 If the LRAC projections were accurate, the PSC staff calculated
that the present value of the stream of payments would amount to a 4.7%
discount. It used an 11% discount rate and assumed that the short run
avoided cost would equal the projected LRAC. See EPA Approval Request,
supra note 31, at 11.
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Niagara's projections were accurate, they would have
resulted in a negative price in the last decade.
The litigation concerned Niagara's demand for assurance
that NorCon would perform. The initial agreement did, in
fact, provide for some security:
In order to secure the operation of the PLANT by the
SELLER during the term of this AGREEMENT and
to secure the balance of the Adjustment Account,
SELLER hereby pledges a security interest in the
amount of any positive balance in the Cumulative
Avoided Cost Account, or the Adjustment Account, as
the case may be, in the PLANT to NIAGARA. The
lien created shall be upon all the works, plant,
properties, and real and personal, constituting the
PLANT in NIAGARA's favor.a5
The PSC rejected the agreement as insufficient and asked
for increased assurance.
The first amendment to the
agreement required that NorCon provide a letter of credit in
the thirteenth year if at that time Niagara projected a
positive balance at the end of the third period (this
mechanism was included in another litigated case,

Kamine/Besicorp Allegany v. Rochester Gas & Electric).36
However, the PSC rejected that as well.
The second
amendment eliminated that letter of credit and instead
required that NorCon enter into a long-term fuel supply
contract at fixed prices.3 7 Since the largest component of the
LRAC is the cost of fuel, NorCon's fuel costs were expected to
be closely correlated with the projected LRAC. 38 Of course,
NorCon-Niagara Agreement, supra note 31, at 18.
Kamine/Besicorp Allegany L.P. v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 908
F. Supp. 1180, 1185 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).
37 Verified Complaint T 34-39, Encogen Four Partners, L.P. v.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 914 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (No. 94
Civ. 1530) [hereinafter Verified Complaint] (on file with the Columbia
Business Law Review) vacated sub nom. NorCon Power Partners v.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 163 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
38 In calculating the LRAC for Niagara for 1992, the PSC found that
about three quarters of the cost was for fuel. Order Adopting Long-Run
Avoided Cost Estimates, Case No. 91-E-0237 (N.Y. Dep't Pub. Serv. June
26, 1992).
35

36

No. 1:38]

NOR CON V NIA GA RA MOHA WK

55

that only provided security if fuel prices rose more than had
been anticipated. It did not provide security if, as actually
happened, prices or other costs fell.39
It is important to bear in mind that Niagara did not want
to enter into the contract. In its brief, Niagara stated:
The contract at issue is not an ordinary contract that
reflects the voluntary assumption of obligations and
Instead, Niagara
risks by contracting parties.
Mohawk was required to enter into the contract with
NorCon by ... [PURPA and New York Public Service
Law Section 66-c]. The terms of the contract were
dictated by the New York Public Service
Commission ... 40
The PSC chimed in. Although the PSC initially had
approved the contract, by 1997 it had come to regret that
decision. It could neither revise the contract nor order the
parties to do so. It did, however, file an amicus brief on

39 In 1999, NorCon's counsel claimed that the contract price for gas
was 72% above market and that NorCon had paid $10 million above
market in 1998. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Norcon Power
Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., No. 94 Civ. 1530 (S.D.N.Y
May 21, 1999) [hereinafter Summary Judgment Hearing] (on file with the
author).
40 Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 2, NorCon Power Partners, L.P. v.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 705 N.E.2d 656 (N.Y. 1998) (No. 10518) (on
file with the Columbia Business Law Review). In its reply brief, Niagara
emphasized the non-voluntary nature of its acquiescence:

The PSC required Niagara Mohawk to agree to front
loaded pricing (i.e., pricing that resulted in overpayments
during the initial years of the contract) and security terms
that Niagara Mohawk deemed inadequate .

. .

. Niagara

Mohawk brought an Article 78 challenge against one of the
PSC's rulings, but without success . . . . Even though

Niagara Mohawk did not thereafter challenge every
additional contract that incorporated similar front loaded
pricing and inadequate security terms, Niagara Mohawk's
entry into these contracts was hardly voluntary.
Reply Brief of Appellant at 2-3, NorCon 705 N.E.2d 656 (No. 10518)
(citations omitted) (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review).
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Niagara's side, stressing the non-voluntary nature of the
agreement:
In traditional contract law, it is assumed that parties
are able to negotiate reasonable agreements and,
when necessary, protect themselves against nonperformance through agreed-upon damages. This
assumption loses force when parties are coerced into
agreements by, in this case, federal law. [This is
authority] for the proposition that contracts of
adhesion are an exception to the rule that courts see
no harm in express agreements limiting the damages
to be recovered for breach of contract. . . . Here . . .
the contracts were imposed upon Niagara Mohawk.4 1
This is quite a remarkable statement. Despite the fact
that it had monitored the negotiations, forced two
amendments, and ultimately approved the agreement, the

PSC labels this a "contract of adhesion." It is not clear
whether the PSC's position represents a change of heart
when the potential adverse effects on rate-payers became
apparent, or whether it was the result of a change in
administration. 4 2 Regardless, the not-quite-voluntary nature
of the contract was apparent, a fact ignored by the court in
its characterization of "this kind of controversy." 4 3

41

Brief for PSC as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant at

6, NorCon 704 N.E.2d 656 (No. 10518) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Noble Lowndes Int'l,
Inc., 84 N.Y.2d 430, 436 (1994) (citing 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1068) (on
file with the Columbia Business Law Review).
42 In the interim, George Pataki had replaced Mario Cuomo as
governor, and John O'Mara had replaced Peter Bradford as chairman of
the PSC.
43 In the hearing on NorCon's motion for summary judgment, after
remand, Judge Sprizzo emphasized the non-voluntary nature of the
contract:
It wasn't as if they assumed this risk. The state said, you
will do this. The state justification for saying, you will do
this, was that we don't think your downside is so great and
you have the security under the second subordinated lien.
Now it turns out the risk is much greater than the state
assumed at the time that they forced the contract upon
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IV. THE PROBLEM
It became apparent almost immediately that the 1988
LRACs were much too high. In 1993, updated LRACs were
produced, incorporating current information about prices.
Table 1 shows that they were about half the 1988 figures
(see Table 1). If the discrepancy continued, the floor price
would kick in and the adjustment account would grow
rapidly. While the tracking mechanism would, in principle,
equalize the payments over the life of the agreement, if the
adjustment account were substantial, the temptation for
NorCon to simply walk away in the final ten years would be
great.44 Niagara (and other electric utilities) wanted out,
and as a result, deployed many strategies. For example, one
utility's complaint alleged
[C]ommercial impracticability/impossibility, mutual
mistake, frustration of purpose, and anticipatory
breach/prospective inability to perform. The action
sought a declaration of the rights and obligations of
the parties to the PPA, its rescission or, in the
alternative, an Order directing the debtor to provide
adequate assurances that it would perform the
PPA. 45
As a result of this contract and others with IPPs, Niagara
was overpaying for electricity. In its 1994 annual report,
Niagara estimated that "it made excess payments of
approximately $205 million in 1993 and approximately $364
million in 1994 and expects to make excess payments of

them, and there is a serious question as to whether the
state would have forced the contract on them with
knowledge of how large a risk this was going to be.
Summary Judgment Hearing, supra note 39, at 16.
44 From the PSC's perspective, the pricing would be inefficient-too
high in the first fifteen years and too low in the last ten. If NorCon and
others succeeded in walking away, the too-low prices might not
materialize at all.
45 In re Kamine/Besicorp Allegany, L.P., 214 B.R. 953, 958 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1997) (citations omitted).
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approximately $409 million in 1995."46 To extricate itself,
Niagara utilized buyouts and demands for assurance. Early
on, Niagara proposed buyouts:
In 1992 and 1993, Niagara Mohawk had contacted
various other developers about the possibility of
either delaying the start of construction or canceling
projects. Niagara Mohawk makes no secret of the
fact that it considers the above-market price terms
the PSC imposes on contracts like the Agreement
with O'Shanter to be economically unreasonable. As
explained in the September 20, 1993 letter to
O'Shanter, Niagara Mohawk's buy-out policy was "to
pay up to one and one half (1.5) times of actual
project expenditures."4 7
As we shall see in Part VI, Niagara Mohawk did finally
succeed in buying out many of the contracts, including
NorCon's. Additionally, Niagara sent letters demanding
assurance of performance in the out years to NorCon and
eight other IPPs. 48 The extent to which the buy-out offers
and demand letters overlapped is unclear.
The utilities also engaged in flyspecking the contracts.
An example of this was Niagara's negotiation with
O'Shanter. 49 In the early negotiations, the buy-out price was
in the $2-3 million range. But in a ruling on another
contract, the PSC held that the PPA was "site specific."so
That is, if the contract was for a plant to be built at a specific
site, and if the site of the plant changed after the contract
had been approved, then the contract would no longer apply.

46 Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar.
29, 1995), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/71932/
0000071932-95-000034.txt.
47 O'Shanter Res., Inc. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 915 F. Supp.
560, 563 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (citations omitted).
48 Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Aug.
15, 1994), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/71932/
0000071932-94-000047.txt.
49 O'Shanter, 915 F. Supp. at 563.
at 563 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. Case
50 Id.
No. 89-E-1158 (N.Y. Dep't Pub. Serv. Dec. 28, 1993)).
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Since the planned location of O'Shanter's plant had been
moved after the PSC approved the agreement, the validity of
the contract became an issue. Niagara thereupon reduced its
buy-out offer to $50,000.1
The Niagara-NorCon contract established a floor and
ceiling in the second period based on the 1988 LRAC. Within
months of NorCon's completion of the plant and the
beginning of production, the PSC produced the 1993 LRACs,
which were substantially below the 1988 numbers. Both
None of the briefs
schedules are shown in Table 1.
addressed how Niagara (as well as the other electric utilities
and the PSC) failed to anticipate the sharp decline in LRAC
projections, given that the new projections were produced so
close to the contract date. I will return to this question in
Part VI.
In October 1992, before NorCon had delivered any power,
Niagara filed a petition with the PSC asking that it require
NorCon and other IPPs "to provide additional assurance to
secure their future performance."5 2 Subsequently, Niagara
asked that the PSC suspend action; the PSC refused, and in
June 1993 deemed the petition withdrawn. On February 4,
1994, two and a half years after the contract was signed, and
a little over a year after NorCon's first delivery, Niagara sent
NorCon a letter demanding that it provide assurance that it
would meet its obligations in the third period.
Niagara Mohawk believes that due to changes in
economic conditions since the agreement was
entered, NorCon cannot and will not perform its
repayment obligations in the later years of the
Niagara Mohawk, therefore, is
Agreement.
demanding that within 30 days from receipt of this
letter, NorCon provide adequate assurances to
Niagara Mohawk that NorCon will duly perform all
51 Ironically, in the course of their dispute, O'Shanter demanded
assurance that Niagara would perform and Niagara denied that it had to
do so. O'Shanter,915 F. Supp. at 566.
52 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 10, NorCon Power Partners, L.P. v.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 705 N.E.2d 656 (N.Y. 1998) (No. 10518) (on
file with the Columbia Business Law Review).
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of its future repayment obligations, including the
obligation to deliver electricity in the later years of
the Agreement at prices less than Niagara Mohawk's
avoided costs and the obligations to repay in full any
balance on the advance extended by Niagara
Mohawk's customers which remains at the end of the
Agreement's twenty-five year term. 53
If NorCon failed to give such assurance within 30 days,
Niagara claimed that it would treat the failure as
repudiation, and would have the right to terminate the
agreement.
Niagara commissioned a study by an economic consulting
firm to support its claim:
[B]ased on reasonable assumptions for NorCon's fuel
costs and operating and maintenance expensesdetermined by Niagara Mohawk's independent
consultants [NERA] based on their many years of
experience in the power production businessNorCon would have negative operating income
ranging from approximately $23.2 million to $108.9
million in every year of the third period. Because it
seems unlikely that NorCon would continue to
operate the plant in the face of such substantial
operating losses, but rather would more likely
abandon the plant, Niagara Mohawk's customers
appear unlikely to receive any repayment during the
third period of the excess payment accrued in the
Cumulative Avoided Cost Account during the second
period. In effect, Niagara Mohawk's customers
would be advancing over $610 million to NorCon
during the second period with no prospect of
repayment.5 4
In its brief, Niagara
forcefully:

53
54

restated the

argument

more

Demand Letter, supra note 30, at 1.
Id. at 16. In 1999, at the summary judgment hearing, Niagara's

counsel claimed that the company was losing $1 million per week.

Summary Judgment Hearing, supra note 39, at 24.
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Due to a dramatic drop in the price of electricity from
other sources of supply, which the PSC did not
foresee at the time that it dictated the terms of the
contract, the estimated amount that NorCon will
have to repay under the contract has skyrocketed
from about $21 million to over $610 million, a nearly
30-fold increase. To repay the latter amount, NorCon
would have to supply electricity for free and pay
Niagara Mohawk between $25 million and $125
million each year during the last ten years of the
contract. 5
Moreover, Niagara claimed, the value of the plant-the
contractual security-would fall well short of the cumulative
account. By the end of the second period (fifteen years), the
shortfall was projected to be $412 million.1
What could NorCon do that would satisfy Niagara? The
letter provided a number of suggestions:
The adequate assurances of NorCon's future
performance requested by this letter conceivably
could take many forms. Without attempting to be
exhaustive, Niagara Mohawk would be willing to
accept any step that reasonably ensures the
performance of NorCon's future repayment options,
including the posting of a letter of credit or the
creation of an escrow account to reserve the amounts
necessary to meet the repayment obligations as they
mature. Niagara Mohawk, however, invites any
other proposal that assures performance of NorCon's
repayment obligations in a commercially reasonable
manner in light of the particular nature of the
insecurity described above.5 7
NorCon disputed both the numbers and the notion that it
should provide any assurance beyond what was already in
the contract.
To determine the annual prices, the

55

Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 2-3, NorCon Power Partners, L.P.

v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 705 N.E.2d 656 (N.Y. 1998) (No. 10618)

(on file with the Columbia Business Law Review).
56 Demand Letter, supra note 30, at 7.
57

Id. at 8-9.
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consultants simply plugged in the best current estimate of
future prices, namely the 1993 projected LRAC. NorCon
objected to this on the grounds that there were large
fluctuations in the components making up the LRAC and
that projected LRAC did not necessarily correspond to actual
prices.
NorCon noted that the PSC's amicus brief, while
supporting Niagara, used 1997 LRAC and concluded that the
shortfall would be $330 million, not $610 million. 9 NorCon
was certainly correct in arguing that the fifteen-year
projection of LRAC in 1993 would diverge from realized
avoided costs in the same period, and, given the volatility of
fuel prices, that the deviation could be large.60 With regard
to the adequate assurance claim, NorCon made three points.
First, the agreement already took the assurance issue into
account. Second, Niagara (and the PSC) knew the risks.
Third, NorCon would not have been able to provide such
assurance and Niagara knew it. NorCon pointed out that
increased assurance would be at the expense of its lender,
who relied on the cash flow. The lender would most likely

58 At trial NorCon's witnesses claimed that they could not project
gains or losses so far into the future:

THE COURT: The bottom line, I take it-I guess you have
been tendered as an expert on rate projections-is that you
cannot say with a reasonable degree of certitude as an
expert that the moneys to be recouped that are in the third
phase of this contract will or will not be sufficient to put
the tracking balance in equilibrium or something close to
equilibriumTHE WITNESS: Yes.
However, NorCon's
Transcript of Record, supra note 29, at 318.
contemporaneous documents (reports to GE Capital in 1993-1996)
included projections of a deficit in the tracking account ranging from $670
to $714 million.
59 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 30-31, NorCon, 705 N.E.2d 656 (No
10518) (citing Brief for PSC as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 8,
NorCon, 705 N.E.2d 656 (No. 10518)).
60 The pricing structure was premised on the assumption that
although the variance might be large, there would not be any bias, so that
the 1988 LRAC would represent the mean of the distribution.
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refuse to allow a change.'. Moreover, if the Niagara
projections were at all plausible, no third party would be
willing to guarantee NorCon's third period obligation.
V. THE LITIGATION
Shortly after receiving the demand letter, NorCon filed
suit asking for a declaratory judgment that it need not
Niagara counterclaimed
provide additional assurance. 62
seeking a declaration that it had properly invoked a right to
demand adequate assurance. A second IPP, Encogen, which
had entered into a similar three-period, twenty-five-year
contract with Niagara also sued, and the two cases were
considered together. 63 Niagara sent Encogen a demand
letter the same day that it sent one to NorCon, claiming
projected losses of $330 million.64 The Encogen agreement
also included a lien upon the plant as assurance. The court
emphasized that the lien was Niagara's exclusive remedythe contract language was stronger than that in the NorCon
agreement.6 5 Niagara argued that the right to demand
adequate assurance was implicit in the regulatory
framework, but the court would have none of it:
Niagara Mohawk further contends that the right to
demand adequate assurances is a corollary to the
prohibition under New York regulatory law against
electricity rates set by the PSC that would result in a
substantial overcharge to [the utility's] rate
61 "As is common in the independent power production industry . . .
NorCon financed the construction of its power plant under a project
financing commitment. Niagara is fully aware that a project financed
facility cannot provide additional security, in cash or other assets, after
the plant has been financed." Verified Complaint, supra note 37, 79.
62 Id.
1.
63 Encogen Four Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 914
F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated sub nom. NorCon Power Partners
L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 163 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
64 Id. at 59-60.
65 Id.
at 59 n.5 ("The Encogen Agreement provides that 'Niagara's
exclusive remedy for [Encogen's] failure to pay the balance of the
Adjustment Account is to foreclose its lien upon the [Encogen] plant."').

64
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payers.... Notwithstanding that comprehensive
regulatory scheme, neither Congress nor the New
York legislature created a right to demand adequate
assurances where an otherwise approved rate might,
in the distant future, prove economically
disadvantageous to the utility purchaser.6 6
Holding that New York law does not provide for a right to
demand adequate assurance, the court granted Encogen's
motion to dismiss Niagara's counterclaim. On appeal, the
Second Circuit certified the question to the New York Court
of Appeals, which, as noted in Part I, gave an affirmative
answer to a narrower question.
The court noted with approval some of the commentary
favoring the recognition of the right to demand assurance
and was "now persuaded that the policies underlying the
UCC 2-609 counterpart should apply with similar cogency
for the resolution of this kind of controversy."6 It continued
with language that failed to distinguish this kind of
controversy from any other:
A useful analogy can be drawn between the contract
at issue and a contract for the sale of goods. If the
contract here was in all respects the same, except
that it was for the sale of oil or some other tangible
commodity instead of the sale of electricity, the
parties would unquestionably be governed by the
demand for adequate assurance of performance
factors in UCC 2-609."
The court does not hint at what might distinguish
electricity from other non-goods transactions. Nor, for that
matter, does it distinguish between long-term electricity
contracts and shorter-term, or spot, electricity contracts.
And, of course, it said nothing about whether the regulatory

66 Encogen, 914 F. Supp. at 62 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
67 NorCon Power Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 163
F.3d 153, 160 (1988).
68 Id.
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framework or contractual language dealing with assurance
had any bearing on the right to demand assurance.
The Second Circuit then vacated the district court opinion
and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the
opinion. A bench trial was held in the summer of 1999, but
on November 23, 1999, before a verdict was handed down,
the case settled.6 9 The terms of the settlement will be
presented in Part VII.
VI. THE CONTRACT ASSIGNED THE RISKS
Had the contract worked as planned, there would have
been a modest overpayment in the first few years (the sixcent rate exceeded the projected LRAC), which would have
been made up in the later years so that the present value of
the payment stream would have been about five percent less
than if Niagara Mohawk had paid current LRAC for the
entire twenty-five-year period. The fifteen-year loan would
have been paid off by the revenue stream from the first two
periods. Things do not always go as they are planned,
however, especially when the planning horizon is as long as
twenty-five years and the underlying data are volatile.
When things did go awry, Niagara responded with its
demand for assurance. NorCon's grounds for refusing to
provide that assurance were (A) Niagara should have known
that the 1988 LRACs were too high; (B) fuel prices were
volatile and so, therefore, were Niagara's tariff rates; and (C)
Niagara was keenly aware of the need for security and
bargained for it. There was ample evidence in the materials
available to the courts to support the last two propositions;
although the first would appear to be obvious, it turns out to
be problematic.
The 1988 LRACs Were Too High

A.

Shortly after the agreement was approved, the PSC
issued new LRACs which were, as noted, about 50% below
the 1988 LRACs which had been incorporated into the
69

1999 Annual Report, supra note 23.
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contract.
NorCon emphasized Niagara's role in the
determination of LRAC schedules both in the past"o and in
the new LRAC schedule.n According to the complaint:
Niagara was aware at the time of the execution of the
Second Amendment of the possibility that LRACs
would be dropping significantly. Niagara was aware
of this from, among other sources, its participation
commencing in March 1991 in the LRAC adjustment
proceeding, the PSC's suspension of the 1990 LRACs
in 1991, the PSC's public support for the concept of
non-utility generators bidding for projects, and the
expected impact of such bidding. 72
In an affidavit, NorCon's counsel noted:
The PSC in its March 12, 1991 Order instituting the
LRAC

proceeding

. . . publicly stated that the

'[present) LRACs may be substantially overstated' . .
. Mr. Coram [one of the Niagara executives involved
in negotiating the contract] testified that this March
1991 Order gave him reason to believe the LRACs
would be substantially reduced, and heightened his

70

In support of its motion for summary judgment, NorCon stated that

Throughout the 1980s, Niagara Mohawk believed the
LRACs to be overstated, and therefore advocated and
actively lobbied the PSC to reduce LRACs. Niagara
Mohawk participated in a number of LRAC proceedings
prior to 1991 in which it argued that the LRACs should be
reduced. Thus, the fact that the LRACs were reduced in
1992 could hardly have surprised Niagara Mohawk.
Affidavit of Thomas J. Hall in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment 69, Encogen Four Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp., 914 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), (No. 94 Civ. 1530), vacated sub

nom. NorCon Power Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 163
F.3d 153 (2d. Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Affidavit of Thomas J. Hall].
71 At trial, a Niagara Mohawk witness testified that the firm believed
that the 1988 LRAC was too high in 1990, but "in the '90 time frame
neither did we know that these things would go to half . . . or that the

forecast would be off by a factor of 2, however you want to state it."
Transcript of Record, supranote 29, at 497.
72 Verified Complaint, supra note 37, 1 64.
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concern over the risk of non-performance in the later
years of these contracts . .

.73

He also noted that Niagara made internal calculations of the
effects of differences between the contractual LRACs and
possible future Niagara avoided costs.
NorCon did offer one possible explanation for the sharp
reduction in the LRAC schedule:
The 1988 LRACs reflected the costs of new power
plants that Niagara Mohawk would have to build
over the next 20 years to meet demand. By 1992,
NorCon and other cogenerators had contractually
committed to build those power plants and supply
that energy, so the costs of those plants were not
reflected in the 1992 incremental cost study.74
That is, the capital costs of new construction would not be
incorporated into the LRAC. Still, one would have thought
that this possibility would have occurred to Niagara.
Given the timing, it would seem that Niagara failed to
recognize an obvious problem. Anyone negotiating a deal in
1991 should have seen the LRAC decline coming. If Niagara
were the only one to err, that would be a powerful argument.
But Niagara was not alone. Other utilities were also stuck
with contracts with 1988 LRACs. Despite the fact that such
a large drop in the projected LRACs should have been
anticipated by anyone paying attention, everyone seems to
have missed it.
Eugene Meehan, who was Niagara's economic expert, has
suggested to me how this puzzle might be resolved. NorCon
originally petitioned the PSC to order Niagara to sign a
contract in December 1988. A contract based on 1988
LRACs, which were still fresh at the time of drafting, was
signed in April 1989. While that contract was not approved
by the PSC until the 1991 amendments, the obligation from
75 (citations and
73 Affidavit of Thomas J. Hall, supra note 70,
internal quotation marks omitted).
74 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 10 n.5, NorCon Power Partners, L.P. v.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 705 N.E. 2d 656 (N.Y. 1998) (No. 10518)
(on file with the Columbia Business Law Review).
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a regulatory perspective was incurred with the signing of the
original contract, and NorCon was entitled to the 1988
LRACs. The regulatory process would, therefore, have
locked in the 1988 LRACs long before the amended
agreement was executed. Hence, when the contract was
finally executed in 1991, Niagara knew what it was getting
into, but it was incapable of avoiding a terrible deal. The
original contract, signed in 1989, locked in NorCon's
entitlement to the 1988 LRACs. That would resolve the
puzzle, but it suggests another one: why did the parties fail
to mention this in their briefs? NorCon's omission is
understandable-it
wanted to emphasize Niagara's
awareness of the likelihood that LRACs would be reduced.
Niagara's silence is more problematic. Rather than arguing
that it was aware that the LRACs were too high (and
implicitly saying that it had accepted the risk) when it
entered into the agreement, it might have felt more
comfortable arguing that changed conditions had upset the
initial deal.
B.

Volatility

The volatility of LRAC projections was well understood by
industry participants before Niagara and NorCon began
negotiating their agreement. In a 1988 report, the FERC
noted the problems with any long-term, fixed-price contract:
Efficiency problems are especially likely when a longterm contract attempts to predict future fuel prices.
Relative fuel prices have been especially volatile in
the last few years. The potential for rapid and
significant change in relative fuel prices in the
presence of fixed-price contracts suggests the
possibility of problems in the electric utility industry
similar to the take-or-pay problems that developed in
the natural gas industry.75
It continued: "To avoid problems such as those associated
with take-or-pay contracts in the natural gas industry, the
Commission wishes to stress the danger of including
7

FERC Admin. Determination, supra note 14.
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forecasted fuel costs in the fixed rate structure of long-term
contracts."76 Ironically, fuel prices were not the cause of the
decline in either the measured LRAC or the actual avoided
costs of Niagara and other utilities; oil prices were actually
higher in mid-1992 than they were in 1988.
The FERC noted that fixed-price, front-loaded contracts
presented a number of problems. Even if they worked
properly there would be intergenerational equity problems:
today's rate-payers would subsidize future payers. There
would be short-term inefficiency because the utility would
have to take power from the QF even if its costs exceeded the
current LRAC. And, of course, if the contract price turned
out to be substantially higher than the current LRAC, as in
fact happened, rate-payers would be hurt and the utility's
viability might be threatened."
The Commission believes that designers and
evaluators of fixed-price contracts need to encourage
contracts that strike a balance between increased QF
security and lowered transactions costs on the one
hand, and increased inequity to ratepayers and
economic inefficiency on the other. Such a balance
can be achieved by manipulating both the pricing
mechanism and other, non-price features of the
contract."
Whether parties could produce a contract structure that
achieved such a balance is unclear; the NorCon-Niagara
agreement did not even try.
Niagara-and everyone in the business-was aware of
the risks of significant price changes. The second period
pricing established a fixed range of prices-the projected
LRACs, plus or minus ten percent. Niagara's risk, if the
FERC Admin. Determination, supranote 14.
In arguing for approval of the Master Restructuring Agreement
('MRA"), Niagara said "Niagara Mohawk insists the MRA is prudent, that
bankruptcy is the likely alternative, and that corporate insolvency would
not serve the public interest." Order Adopting Rates, Changes, Rules and
Regulations for Electric Street Lighting Service, Case No. 94-E-0099 (N.Y.
Dep't Pub. Serv. Mar. 20, 1998), 1998 WL 214902, at *8.
78 FERC Admin. Determination, supra note 14.
76

77
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floor were binding for a reasonable length of time, was
substantial.
C.

Security

Niagara's concerns about the adequacy of its security predated the NorCon contract. In a 1988 decision rejecting
Niagara's position in an earlier dispute, the court recognized
Niagara's concern about the risk of an IPP's nonperformance in a front-loaded contract, but it nonetheless
upheld the PSC's finding that the security was adequate:
[The] PSC's authorization of front-loaded pricing
contracts of the type employed here are not
uncommon in the case of hydroelectric facilities.
That PSC is keenly aware that front-loaded contracts
subject the purchaser, ultimately ratepayers, to the
peril that the facility may never be capable of
producing electricity at rates less than or equal to
avoided costs is apparent from the agreement PSC
ordered petitioner to enter into, for it capped the
extent of the advanced payment to an amount equal
to the asset value of the Shawmut facility and also
gave petitioner a security interest in the plant with
the option of possessing and operating it until
repayment
was
accomplished.
Petitioner's
dissatisfaction with the adequacy of its repayment
security, though understandable, does not, as the
Supreme Court observed, warrant a court
substituting its judgment for that of the agency,
where, as here, it has not been shown that the
manner in which PSC exercised its judgment was
irrational.
In 1988, prior to the NorCon-Niagara
theFERC explicitly recognized the problem:

agreement,

One risk to ratepayers is that a QF may simply go
out of business or otherwise abrogate the contract in
the later years of a front-loaded contract. This would

79 Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 530 N.Y.S.2d
626, 629 (App. Div. 1988) (emphasis added).
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mean that the future benefits paid for in the early
years would never materialize. To the extent that
this is a real problem, it may be dealt with through
contractual provisions, such as liens on the QF's
physical assets or through other legally enforceable
sanctions for non-compliance.8 0
The FERC also noted that substantial problems had arisen
with QF contracts:
Complaints of overpayments to QFs have been well
publicized. For example, Houston Lighting and
Power Co. estimates it will incur over $500 million in
overpayments over the next eight years Niagara
Mohawk Power Co. claims that the New York Public
Service Commission estimated the company will
incur $180 million in overpayments by 2000 and
Pacific Gas and Electric Co. claims it will incur $857
million in overpayments per year by 1990.81

In his affidavit, NorCon's lawyer cited substantial
deposition testimony by Niagara executives regarding their
concerns about the adequacy of the security in this
contract.8 2 For example:

Q. Now, am I correct that Niagara Mohawk foresaw
the possibility that the lien on the plant might not be
sufficient to satisfy the balance of the tracking
account at the end of the term of this contract?
A. Yes, we were convinced of it. Niagara Mohawk did
sensitivity studies to determine what the exposure
was in the event that there was deviations from the
then current LRACS [sic].83
What remains unclear is whether Niagara conveyed the
inevitability of disaster, given the newer information, and
whether the PSC took it into account.

80
81
82
83

FERC Admin. Determination, supra note 14.
Id. at n.24 (citations omitted).
See Affidavit of Thomas J. Hall, supra note 70,
See id. 34.

33-39.
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In Sum

So by the time Niagara was negotiating the NorCon
agreement, it and the rest of the industry were well aware of
the need for security in the long-term QF contracts. It
wanted greater security, fought for it, but was unable to
convince the PSC that it should have it. When the contract
turned out to be a disaster, Niagara sought the security it
could not get in the initial bargain. The court gave it at least
a fighting chance of succeeding. The PSC, reversing itself,
now believed that the security was inadequate (true) and
that the court should require the additional security (since
the PSC could not legally do so). To be clear, if Niagara did
actually have the right to demand assurance, NorCon could
not have provided it. The result would have been the same
as if the court had excused Niagara by invoking
impracticability, frustration, or mutual mistake.
VII. SETTLEMENT
In 1996, while the NorCon case was still pending in the
Second Circuit, Niagara initiated negotiations to terminate,
restate, or amend a substantial portion of its above-market
PPAs, including NorCon's. The negotiations culminated in a
Master Restructuring Agreement ("MRA"); the initial version
was for sixteen IPPs, but NorCon and one other opted out.
NorCon did, however, agree to continue negotiating in good
faith. 84 Niagara paid a substantial price in cash and stock;
84

Paragraph 2.5 of the Master Restructuring Agreement states:
The Company and NorCon shall conduct separate good
faith negotiations to enter into an agreement (the "NorCon
Agreement") regarding the amendment, amendment and
restatement, other restructuring or termination of
NorCon's Existing PPA. The Company and NorCon agree
to commence such negotiations, at a mutually agreeable
location(s), promptly following the date of this Agreement
and to meet not less frequently than weekly during the
first month following the date of this Agreement and
thereafter as the Company and NorCon may mutually
agree. . . .

In the event the Company and NorCon are
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the agreement reduced annual IPP payments by about $500
million. Niagara summarized the essential features of the
deal:
The MRA was consummated on June 30, 1998
with 14 IPPs. The MRA allowed Niagara Mohawk to
terminate, restate or amend 27 PPAs which
represented approximately three-quarters of its overmarket purchase power obligations.
Niagara
Mohawk terminated 18 PPAs for 1,092 MW of
electric generating capacity, restated 8 PPAs
representing 535 MW of capacity and amended one
PPA representing 42 MW of capacity.
Niagara
Mohawk paid the IPP Parties an aggregate of $3.934
billion in cash, of which $3.212 billion was obtained
through a public market offering of senior unsecured
debt, $303.7 million from the public sale of 22.4
million shares of common stock, and the remainder
from cash on hand. In addition, the Company issued
20.5 million shares of common stock to the IPP
5
Parties.8
The NorCon dispute was remanded, and a bench trial was
held in Summer 1999. At trial, Niagara's expert testified
that the tracking account stood at $107 million in 1998 and
that he projected it would grow to $835 million by 2007; the
contract rate in year 16, he said, would be negative $90 per
megawatt hour.8 ' That is, NorCon would have defaulted and
surrendered its plant to Niagara.
Judge Sprizzo professed to being unclear as to his
mandate; he urged the parties to settle:
unable to agree in writing on the additional consideration,
if any, to be received by NorCon within seventy-five (75)
days after the date of this Agreement (which date may be
extended with the mutual agreement of the Company and
NorCon), then (i) this Agreement shall terminate with
respect to NorCon ....
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., Current Report 10 (Form 8-K) (July 9,
1997), available at http://secfilings.nyse.com/filing.php?doc=l&attach=ON
&ipage=353483&rid=23.
85 1999 Annual Report, supra note 23, pt. II, item 7.
86 Transcript of Record, supra note 29, at 620-22.
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[I]t is really a question of how we fit the law to
this set of facts. We are in uncharted territory. The
first time around, I thought the law was clearer. I
dismissed the action on the theory they were not
entitled as a matter of law to reasonable assurances.
Now the Court of Appeals says that maybe they are
entitled to assurances as a matter of fact. Then you
are in the realm of what I call equitable discretion
and how much I have. That has to be briefed for me
at the end of the case. The Court of Appeals will be
operating on an abuse-of-discretion standard.
I don't practice law any more-although, in a
sense, I guess I do-but it is big dice to roll on the
exercise of any judge's discretion. I don't care who
the judge is-I say that with all humility, having sat
on the bench for almost eighteen years-we don't
always get it right. And sometimes, when we get it
right, we get reversed, and sometimes, when we get it
wrong, we get affirmed. It is a big risk to take.
I think, if you have some money out there in the
family tree, so to speak, as apparently you do, then
maybe settlement should get on the table here, and
maybe they will take something less than 100 cents
on the dollar by way of assurances with respect to the
contract.
Before a verdict was rendered, on November 23, 1999, the
parties did indeed settle. The PPA would be terminated and
NorCon would receive $125 million. And so, five years after
Niagara sent its demand letter, the dispute was resolved.
Whether the court's answer to the certified question
impacted the settlement, we cannot be certain, although the
judge's comments do suggest that it did. Still, since NorCon
would have had to default if Niagara's right to demand
assurance was upheld, the $125 million payment is pretty
good evidence that the effect on settlement was modest at
best.

87

Transcript of Record, supra note 29, at 329-30.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Sometimes judges talk too much. Had the Court simply
invoked the Restatement, there would have been no basis for
criticizing the decision. But it did not. Instead, it took a
more nuanced approach, invoking "our customary
incremental common-law developmental process, rooted in
particular fact patterns and keener wisdom acquired through
observations of empirical application of a proportioned, less
than absolute, rule in future cases."" Missing from the
opinion, however, are the "particular fact patterns" and
"observations of empirical application." Had it practiced
what it appeared to preach, the Court could have disposed of
this case by recognizing that the contract had been imposed
on Niagara Mohawk as a matter of public policy (however
misguided that turned out to be), and had gone through a
regulatory process that dealt explicitly with the assurance
issues. The risks of a fixed-price, front-loaded twenty-fiveyear agreement were obvious. The parties knew what they
were and attempted to provide for them in the contract.
Assurance was not an afterthought; Niagara had been
concerned about assurance questions in this type of contract
for a decade. For whatever reasons Niagara could not, at
contract formation, convince the PSC to give it more
security.
The New York Court of Appeals clearly liked the idea of
recognizing a common law right to demand assurance. If it
had wanted to do so while still following its incremental
process, it could have stressed the conditions in which it
would not recognize the right. It could have said that while
it was sympathetic in general to the notion that an insecure
party should be able to demand assurance, the facts
precluded it from doing so "in this kind of controversy," one
in which the assurance question had been thoroughly vetted.
For reasons unstated, it chose not to do so. This is not to say
that the Court's bottom line was necessarily wrong-only
that you cannot get there from here.
88 NorCon Power Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 705
N.E.2d 656, 661 (N.Y. 1998).
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One rationalization proffered by the court for its position
was that it might encourage settlement of disputes:
The availability of the doctrine may even provide an
incentive and tool for parties to resolve their own
differences, perhaps without the necessity of judicial
intervention.
Open, serious renegotiation of
dramatic developments and changes in unusual
contractual
expectations
and
qualifying
circumstances would occur because of and with an
eye to the doctrine's application.8 9
The Court did not bother to note that Niagara Mohawk had
already settled a large number of similar claims without the
Court's recognition of the right to demand assurance. Nor
did it suggest why an open-ended standard, which left the
trial court judge befuddled, would be a superior backdrop for
renegotiation than a rule that did not recognize a right to
demand assurance.
By the time the demand letter was sent it had become
apparent that, barring something extraordinary (like $140-abarrel oil), NorCon would not perform in the third period.
But, so what? That simply meant that the parties had
thirteen years to negotiate a buyout. That the FERC/PSC
policies almost bankrupted Niagara is unfortunate, but that
does not justify courts tweaking contract law to bail it out.
Niagara did not formally argue that its performance
should be excused because of changed conditions or mistake.
But, in effect, that would have been the result had the court
affirmed its right to demand assurance. NorCon and the
other QFs could not have provided acceptable assurance, so
Niagara could have walked away from the deals with thirty
days' notice. At least one other New York judge rejected this
ploy:
Furthermore, to suggest as NYSEG does, without
apparently any sense of irony, that the parties were
"mutually mistaken" about the risk that PPA rates
would exceed avoided costs is paradoxical in light of

89

NorCon, 705 N.E.2d at 662.
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the extensive attention paid to the need for a "trueup" or tracking mechanism in the contracts. Indeed,
this risk was identified, discussed and reconciled by
every party or entity even remotely affected by
PURPA, including Congress in enacting the statute,
FERC in prescribing the regulatory scheme, PSC in
implementing it, utilities in forecasting LRACs, and
QFs in making investment and other decisions.90
If the NorCon decision had come from some other
jurisdiction, it might be of little import. But New York is
different. It is the preeminent jurisdiction for commercial
cases. It is generally considered to be a "hard law" or
formalist jurisdiction. The case has had some precedential
affect and the results are hardly encouraging. New York
State and other state courts have essentially ignored the
court's "incremental" approach, extending the adequate
assurances doctrine only to "this kind of controversy."
Instead, the courts have interpreted the NorCon decision to
extend the adequate assurances doctrine to all contracts that
are similar to the sale of goods. 9 1 In one case that did try to
figure out just what the NorCon court meant by "this kind of
controversy," the court specifically pointed out that the
doctrine of adequate assurances has only been extended to
long-term contracts where a change in circumstances and
90 N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Saranac Power Partners L.P., 117
F. Supp. 2d 211, 254 (N.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd, 267 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2001)
(per curiam).
91 See, e.g., McNeal v. Lebel, 953 A.2d 396 (N.H. 2008) (holding that
the trial court was correct to extend the adequate assurances doctrine to a
contract for the construction of a modular home); In re Broadstripe, LLC,
435 B.R. 245 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010) (finding the sale of cable and internet
assets to be close enough to the sale of goods to extend the adequate
assurances doctrine); In re Pac. Gas & Electric Co., 271 B.R. 626 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding the sale of electricity to be sufficiently like the
sale of goods to be allowed the use of adequate assurances); Peng v. Willets
Point Asphalt Corp., 910 N.Y.S.2d 407 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (extending the
doctrine of adequate assurances to real estate cases), aff'd, 915 N.Y.S. 2d
878 (App. Div. 2011); Merrill Lynch Int'l v. XL Capital Assurance Inc., 564
F. Supp. 2d 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding adequate assurances could not be
extended to contracts for collateral debt obligation swaps because they are
not sufficiently like the sale of goods).

789

COL UMIA B USINESS LA W RE VIE W

[Vol. 2013

security provision was not negotiated ex ante. 92 That court
did not, of course, know that NorCon would have failed to
qualify.

92 River Terrace Assocs., LLC v. Bank of N.Y., No. 603745/2002, 2005
WL 3134228, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd sub nom. Bank of N.Y. v. River
Terrace Assocs., LLC 804 N.Y.S. 2d 728 (App. Div. 2005).

